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Abstract
We study the eﬀect of imperfect commitment in non-cooperative twoperson bargaining games. By establishing the reputation for being stubborn, a player sometimes commits to her initial demand, becoming unable
to change her demands or to accept an inferior oﬀer from her opponent.
When the probability of being stubborn is small, the set of equilibria is
shown to be small and agreement may be reached immediately despite the
possibility of stubbornness. A player has greater bargaining power when
she is more patient and/or is more likely to be stubborn.

1

Introduction

When a rational player is faced with a stubborn negotiator who never concedes,
he will accommodate her demand since the rejection will only cause delay. Considering this eﬀect, even a ﬂexible player may pretend to be stubborn if her
opponent is uncertain whether she is ﬂexible or not. Our goal is to show that
this type of strategy increases her bargaining power and, at the same time, that
it does not necessarily lead to delay.
Two players negotiate how to share one dollar. In the beginning, they propose to each other how much they want for themselves. If the sum of their
demands is not greater than one, then they will split midway between their
demands. Otherwise, they keep negotiating until one player lowers her demand
and their demands become compatible.
With small probabilities, we assume that the players become stubborn after
making initial demands. A stubborn type commits herself to her initial demand
and waits for her opponent to accept it. This assumption is motivated by an
observation that negotiation sometimes breaks down because both negotiators
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insist that their own oﬀers should be accepted. (See Crawford, 1982 for some discussion about this type of imperfect commitment.) A player’s nature is known
only to herself; her opponent knows only its likelihood. The stubbornness may
be psychological. For example, a player may become too attached to her own
proposal to accept her opponent’s oﬀer. Or it may be economical. A player
tells her business associates that her reputation is at stake. She may sometimes
convince them that this is so. Then backing oﬀ damages her reputation, which
she thinks to be more important than any agreement.
One characteristic of equilibrium play is that, given incompatible initial demands, one player may accept the oﬀer of the other with a positive probability
in the beginning (initial mass acceptance). Observe that the payoﬀ of a player is
no more than what her opponent oﬀers once the war of attrition starts. Hence, it
is strategically important for her to cause her opponent to make the initial mass
acceptance. She can do that when she has a lower oﬀer, a lower discount rate,
and/or a higher probability of being stubborn, given that other things are equal.
The latter two factors are exogenous, which determine her natural bargaining
power. On the other hand, she can choose the ﬁrst variable strategically. If she
expects her opponent to demand a large share, she can lower her initial demand
and can cause her opponent to make the initial mass acceptance. Because of
this, excessive demands cannot be sustained in equilibrium and the equilibrium
demands tend to be near the just compatible demands that are proportional to
the players’ natural bargaining powers. When the probability of stubborn types
tends to zero, equilibrium outcomes converge to immediate settlement at these
demands.
Commitment has long been recognized as an important factor in determining
bargaining outcomes. Schelling (1960) points this out clearly. Since then, many
works have attempted to understand the exact role that commitment plays in
bargaining games.1 Crawford (1982) formulated imperfect commitment in the
way that players become aware whether they have committed after making their
initial demands. Then the players decide either to accept or to reject once and
for all. In his model, occasionally both players reject and they reach an impasse.
Thus he concluded that the possibility of commitment, which is an important
source of bargaining power, can cause ineﬃcient outcomes. Our model starts
from the same imperfect commitment but allows players to keep negotiating
until an agreement is reached. With this change, the possibility of commitment,
though still serving as a source of bargaining power, becomes compatible with
immediate and eﬃcient settlement. The logic that drives our result is that a
small probability of (irrational) players who behave diﬀerently from the other
(normal) players can cause a big change in equilibrium outcomes. This idea was
ﬁrst formulated in the seminal paper by Kreps et al. (1982). They applied it
to the ﬁnitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma and showed that cooperation arises
when there is a small possibility of tit-for-tat players.2
1 As a recent contribution to this literature, see Fershtman and Seidmann (1993) and
Muthoo (1996) among others.
2 See

also Kreps and Wilson (1982) and Milgrom and Roberts (1982). Some of the recent
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In the paper that stimulated this article, Abreu and Gul (1997) applied this
idea to a non-cooperative, two-person bargaining game.3 (We extensively use
their analyses for the war of attrition stage.) They assume that some players
cannot accept anything less than what these players think to be fair. Then they
use it to explain the possibility of delays in agreement. Since players mimic
various kinds of irrational types with diﬀerent notions for fair settlements, there
is a distribution of demands in the beginning. Thus, incompatible demands
are often made and then a war of attrition arises. In some sense, our model
endogenizes the choice of fair settlements. A player is not necessarily attached
to a particular amount. However, once a demand has been made, it sometimes
becomes the fair demand for that player and anything less becomes unacceptable. Although this behavior is still not completely rational, it may not cause
delays and our model has an equilibrium with an immediate settlement. When
players can choose their initial demands, they tend to choose them to minimize
ineﬃciency.
In the next section, we describe the basic model. The third section establishes the main results that characterize the set of equilibria and identify the
possibility of being stubborn as being a source of bargaining power. Section 4
studies two extensions. The ﬁrst extension studies risk-averse players and relates our result to the asymmetric Nash solution. The other extension treats the
case of inborn stubbornness. The last section makes some concluding remarks.

2

The Basic Model

There are two players, i = 1, 2, who bargain over the partition of one dollar.
(When we say player j, we implicitly refer to the player other than player i.
Player i as well as a generic player takes the female identity while player j
as well as an opponent takes the male identity for ease of exposition.) The
negotiation proceeds in inﬁnite horizon: T = [0, ∞).
When a settlement is reached at time t and player i’s share is y, her utility
is given by ui (y)e−ri t , where ri is her discount rate. For the analyses of the
next section, we assume risk neutrality: ui (y) ≡ y. (We treat risk aversion in
Section 4.) In the case of perpetual disagreement, her utility is given by zero.
The players try to maximize their expected utilities.
In the beginning (t = 0), both players announce simultaneously what they
want for themselves. We call this the demand stage. Player i demands her
share4 to be xi ∈ [0, 1), oﬀering 1 − xi to player j. If xi + xj ≤ 1, the demands
development in this line of research is found in Fudenberg and Levine (1989), Schmidt (1993a),
and Watson (1993). The idea has been applied to the theory of bargaining, e.g., Kornhauser
et al. (1989) and Schmidt (1993b).
3 Abreu and Gul (1997), using the idea developed in this paper, extended their analyses
and study the limit of equilibria in their model when the probabilities to be stubborn converge
to zero. They obtain the results similar to Proposition 3 in our paper. See also Compte and
Jehiel (1996) on this subject.
4 We

assume that the players do not demand the entire share. We can show that the players
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are called compatible and the players will split the money at the middle of their
proposals, i.e., giving xi + (1 − xi − xj )/2 to player i. (If the sum is exactly one,
the demands are said to be just compatible.)
When the demands are incompatible, the players proceed to the war of
attrition stage. Every δ-period, the players decide simultaneously5 what to do
out of two options:
(a) reiterating her previous demand and waiting for her opponent to lower
his demand, or
(b) lowering her own demand.
We assume that the players cannot rescind earlier proposals. Thus a new demand must be lower than any previous ones.6 When at least one player chooses
the second option and the sum of demands becomes no greater than one, the
game ends and they split the money at the middle of their proposals. Otherwise
the game continues. Without a settlement, the process continues forever (perpetual disagreement). Note that lowering one’s demand to the just compatible
level gives one at least what the opponent oﬀers. Slightly abusing the word, we
call this acceptance in this model.
The key assumption of the model is that, with small positive probabilities,
the players commit themselves to their initial demands7 before the war of attrition stage starts. The committed player is called a stubborn type. This type
simply waits for her opponent to accept her oﬀer. Those who are not stubborn
are called ﬂexible. The players know only the probability of their opponents
becoming stubborn and cannot tell whether their opponents are really stubborn
or not. (Actually, if a player knows that her opponent is stubborn, the strategy
in the war of attrition will become trivial. The one who is not stubborn and
knows that her opponent is will accept the opponent’s oﬀer immediately. If both
know that both are stubborn, no agreement will be possible.)
Formally, we assume that player i becomes stubborn with probability zi . We
assume that 0 < zi < 1 and that it is independent from that for player j. This
event happens between the demand stage and the war of attrition stage. Thus,
when they make their initial demands, the players do not know whether they
will become stubborn. In Section 4, we study the case where they do know their
types before the demand stage.
do not want to demand the entire share in equilibrium and thus can prove all the propositions
without this assumption. However, when they do demand the entire share, Lemma 0 needs to
be modiﬁed, which adds extra complexity without increasing insight. Hence, we impose this
assumption.
5 The simultaneity of moves is assumed for the sake of speciﬁcity. As shown in Abreu and
Gul (1997), the equilibrium behaviors in the war of attrition stage do not depend on the
timing or the order of proposals when the interval between oﬀers is suﬃciently short.
6 If the players, especially committed ones, could increase their demands, then there would
be multiple equilibria in the war of attrition stage. This would undermine most of our results.
We thank the editor and the referee for pointing this out.
7 We introduce only this type of irrational behavior, on which our results substantially
depend. The concluding remarks brieﬂy discuss what happens when other kinds of irrationality
exist. We thank the associate editor for this observation.
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Let N be the set of natural numbers. Denote by xti player i’s demand
at time t for t ∈ {0, δ, 2δ, . . .}. The history at time t = nδ for n ∈ N is
t−δ
0
ht = ht−δ × (xt−δ
1 , x2 ) and h = ∅. Player i’s strategy at the demand stage is
0
0
σi : h → [0, 1]. At time t = nδ for n ∈ N , only when player i is ﬂexible does
].
she have a meaningful strategy: σit : ht → [0, xt−δ
i
Our equilibrium concept is a version of the sequential equilibrium adapted
for our dynamic model. (We introduce a stronger reﬁnement in Section 4 for
the analysis of inborn stubbornness.) We require that player i believes player j
to be ﬂexible when he lowered his demand in any previous period. Otherwise,
she updates her belief by Bayes’ rule given that the ex ante probability that
player j becomes stubborn is zj and that the stubborn type of player j commits
himself to his initial demand. This is our consistency condition on beliefs.
Given the beliefs, we require that the players choose the best responses on
any decision nodes, including the ones oﬀ the equilibrium paths. This is our
sequential rationality condition. We require these conditions to be satisﬁed in
any equilibrium.
We actually want to study the case where the players can lower their demands at any moment and thus we regard the above model as an approximation.
In the following analyses, we look at the limit of equilibria as δ → 0.

3

Equilibria

Although the negotiation can be concluded quickly in equilibrium, what happens
when it prolongs is crucial in determining equilibrium outcomes. Hence, we start
from the analysis of the war of attrition and then evaluate the players’ strategies
at the demand stage.

3.1

War of Attrition Stage

Abreu and Gul (1997) have already studied the war of attrition with the possibility of stubborn types. We borrow their results extensively in this subsection
although we will rederive the dynamic path explicitly for the sake of exposition.
Please refer to their paper, especially for the proof of Lemma 0.
Lemma 0 (Abreu and Gul, 1997). Suppose that the initial demands x1 and
x2 are incompatible.
(1) Suppose that player j keeps his initial demand and that player i lowers
for the ﬁrst time at time t(> 0). If the demands are still incompatible, in any
continuation equilibrium, player i’s expected payoﬀ at time t converges to 1 − xj
while that of player j converges to xj , when δ converges to zero.
(2) As δ converges to zero, the equilibrium outcome given the incompatible
initial demands converges to the unique one described below.
(t = 0+): One player may accept her opponent’s oﬀer with a positive probability.
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(0+ < t < T ): The ﬂexible type of player i randomly accepts player j’s oﬀer
at some rate. [Take t and t such that 0 < t < t < T . The probability of
settlement in the interval (t, t ) is positive and it converges to zero when t → t.]
(t ≥ T ): By some time T , any ﬂexible types of both players accept their
opponent’s oﬀer with probability of one. There is no settlement after time T .
The ﬁrst part of this lemma implies that, when the interval between periods δ
is suﬃciently small, the revelation of a player’s type as being ﬂexible is virtually
equivalent to accepting the opponent’s oﬀer in terms of payoﬀs. Hence, the
decision of ﬂexible types essentially becomes whether to accept now or to wait
for a bit longer. Therefore, when we analyze the limit of equilibria as δ → 0, we
simply need to look at the stopping time (i.e., when to accept) as the strategy
of a ﬂexible type, instead of looking at the demand strategy that depends on
history. Using this convention, we compute the limit of the equilibrium path
given incompatible initial demands.
A player wants her opponent to accept her oﬀer, but if he does not, she
wants to accept his oﬀer herself. This situation is commonly known as a war
of attrition. Between time 0+ and time T , a ﬂexible type gradually accepts
her opponent’s oﬀer by choosing the timing of acceptance randomly. Let ai be
the instantaneous rate of acceptance by player i conditional on the fact that
nobody has accepted.8 Given this behavior of player i, player j feels indiﬀerent
between accepting player i’s oﬀer and waiting. Let Vj be the expected payoﬀ
of the ﬂexible type of player j while playing in the war of attrition. Acceptance
gives him 1 − xi . If he waits for an inﬁnitesimal period , player i will accept
his oﬀer with probability ai . Otherwise he will face the same war of attrition
and thus he will expect the same expected payoﬀ Vj at that point. Summarizing
the argument,
accepting:

Vj = 1 − xi ,

waiting:

Vj = ai xj + (1 − ai )e−rj  Vj .

Solving this system of equations and taking  to 0, L’Hospital’s theorem shows
that
rj (1 − xi )
.
ai =
xi + xj − 1
A ﬂexible type waits since there is a chance that her opponent is ﬂexible
and will accept before she does. Thus, the ﬂexible types of both players keep
accepting with a positive probability until the same time T , by which time all
of them accept for sure. Deﬁne Gi (t; T ) to be the probability that player i is
ﬂexible and, in addition, she does not accept by time t (when her opponent does
not accept by that time). Since the ﬂexible type of player i accepts at the rate
8 Many variables introduced in this section, such as a here, are in fact functions of x and
1
i
x2 . For the ease of exposition, we generally omit their dependence.
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of ai and since she accepts by the time T for sure, we have
−

∂Gi (t; T )
1
Gi (t; T ) + zi
∂t
Gi (T ; T )

= ai , and
=

0.

Solving these two equations, we get
Gi (t; T ) = zi (eai (T −t) − 1).
Let Ti be the time needed for the ﬂexible type to accept her opponent’s oﬀer
with probability of one when she does not accept at all in the beginning and
when her opponent does not accept her oﬀer. We call it the potential exhaustion
time. (When time Ti is reached without acceptance, player j believes that player
i is stubborn for sure.) Since the initial probability of player i being ﬂexible is
1 − zi , Ti satisﬁes 1 − zi = Gi (0; Ti ). Hence,
Ti =

1
1
1
xi + xj − 1
log .
log =
ai
zi
rj (1 − xi )
zi

Suppose that, given the initial oﬀers, player i has a shorter potential exhaustion time: Ti < Tj . We know from the discussion above that the ﬂexible
types of both players will accept for sure by the same time. To achieve this,
the ﬂexible type of player j must accept player i’s oﬀer with a mass probability in the beginning of the war of attrition (t = 0+). This phenomenon is
called initial mass acceptance. (The initial mass acceptance is made by at most
one player. Otherwise, both would have an incentive to delay their acceptance
inﬁnitesimally and to wait for the opponent’s acceptance.)
Let P ma be the probability that the initial mass acceptance occurs. When
Ti < Tj , by time Ti , the ﬂexible types of both players accept their opponent’s
oﬀer. Since the ﬂexible type of player j accepts only with probability Gj (0; Ti )
during the period, he has to accept player i’s oﬀer at time 0 with probability
(1 − zj ) − Gj (0; Ti ). Using the above analyses, we get
P ma

=

(1 − zj ) − Gj (0; Ti )

=

1 − zj − zj (eaj Ti − 1)

=

1 − zj

(1−(Ti /Tj ))

.

When Ti = Tj , no player makes the initial mass acceptance, and T = Ti = Tj .

3.2

Demand Stage

The critical strategic decision in this game is the choice of the players’ initial
demands. Even the one who becomes stubborn in the war of attrition stage can
choose her initial demand. This is the departure from the model of Abreu and
Gul (1997).
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First, we compute the expected payoﬀs when the initial demands are incompatible and when player j makes the initial mass acceptance. As a result of
player j’s initial mass acceptance, player i expects to obtain P ma xi . As soon as
the war of attrition starts (t > 0+), the ﬂexible type’s expected payoﬀ is given
by the opponent’s oﬀer. The stubborn type loses the chance of settlement when
her opponent is also stubborn. Since the probability that both are stubborn is
z1 z2 , the expected loss for player i in this case is given by z1 z2 e−ri Ti (1 − xj ).
Combining these, the expected payoﬀ of player i is given by
EPi

= P ma xi + (1 − P ma )(1 − xj ) − z1 z2 e−ri Ti (1 − xj )
=

(1 − xj ) + P ma (xi + xj − 1) − z1 z2 e−ri Ti (1 − xj ).

When the ﬂexible type of player j makes the initial mass acceptance, his payoﬀ
is 1 − xi , which is identical to what he expects at t > 0+. Thus, the expected
payoﬀ of player j is
EPj = (1 − xi ) − z1 z2 e−rj Ti (1 − xi ).
(When T1 = T2 , there is no initial mass acceptance. We regard this as a special
case of the above where P ma = 0.)
The comparison of the above payoﬀs illustrates that the opponent’s initial
mass acceptance is essential for a player to obtain more than what her opponent
oﬀers. From the analysis in the war of attrition stage, the ratio of potential
exhaustion times is given by
log zi ri 1 − xj
Ti
aj log(1/zi )
=
=
.
Tj
ai log(1/zj )
log zj rj 1 − xi
Since this is increasing in xi , decreasing her own demand tends to cause her
opponent to make the initial mass acceptance. This gives players an incentive
not to make excessive demands.
We deﬁne the just compatible demands x∗1 , x∗2 such that the potential exhaustion times of the two players are the same. Namely,
Ti
log zi ri 1 − x∗j
=
Tj
log zj rj 1 − x∗i
x∗i + x∗j

=

1, and

=

1.

Solving this system of equations,
x∗i =

rj log zj
.
ri log zi + rj log zj

In the sense that the relative length of potential exhaustion times determines
who makes the initial mass acceptance, the players’ natural bargaining powers are reﬂected in x∗1 , x∗2 . The next proposition shows that the immediate
settlement at these demands is an equilibrium outcome.
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Proposition 1. The immediate settlement at x∗1 , x∗2 is an equilibrium outcome.
Proof: We examine the best response of player j at the demand stage given
player i’s initial demand x∗i .
Player j has no incentive to demand less than x∗j since x∗1 , x∗2 is just compatible.
Suppose that player j makes a demand xj (> x∗j ). From the analysis above,

we have (∂(Ti /Tj )) ∂xj < 0. Since Ti /Tj = 1 at x∗1 , x∗2 , Tj > Ti holds for
xj > x∗j , and player j will have to make the initial mass acceptance. Then
the above analysis of the expected utilities shows that his payoﬀ is less than
1 − x∗i = x∗j .
Therefore, when player i’s initial demand is x∗i , demanding x∗j is the best
response for player j at the demand stage. By symmetry, the outcome in the
proposition is supported in an equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
There is no loss of eﬃciency in the outcome described in Proposition 1
despite the possibility of stubborn types. As a matter of fact, the players reach a
settlement immediately when they do not choose their initial demands randomly.
Proposition 2. In any equilibrium where the players do not randomly choose
their initial demands, the settlement is immediate.
Proof: Let xi be the initial demand of player i and let xj be that of player j.
Supposing that xi + xj > 1, we derive a contradiction as follows. Without loss
of generality, suppose that Ti ≤ Tj . Then, the initial expected payoﬀ of player
j is given by
EPj = (1 − xi ) − z1 z2 e−rj Ti (1 − xi ).
If he changed his initial demand to the just compatible one (1 − xi ), he could
avoid the chance of impasse and could obtain the payoﬀ (1 − xi ), which is higher
than EPj . This is a contradiction. Therefore, xi + xj ≤ 1, and the negotiation
ends immediately.
Q.E.D.
The possibility of immediate settlement is a clear contrast to other studies
on stubborn negotiators. In Abreu and Gul (1997), prolonged delays occur,
involving the war of attrition. Crawford (1982) shows that, in a single-period
game, players try to commit to incompatible demands. In the former formulation, the stubborn types cannot choose their initial demands, and this creates
a distribution of initial demands, leading to delays. In the latter, demanding
more increases a player’s expected payoﬀ, due to the speciﬁcation of the players’
payoﬀs at a simultaneous concession. (In our dynamic model, there is no simultaneous concession in equilibrium.) Thus the players may have an incentive to
make incompatible demands. On the other hand, in our model, a player who
is expected to make the initial mass acceptance is better oﬀ accepting her opponent’s oﬀer initially and avoiding the chance of impasse. (When the players
choose their initial demands randomly, they may not know who will make the
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initial mass acceptance. As a result, there can be a failure of coordination and
the players may make incompatible demands.)
The equilibrium payoﬀs are close to those speciﬁed in Proposition 1 when the
chance of becoming stubborn is small. To understand this intuitively, suppose
1/z
that zi = αi for some αi > 0 and for some z > 0 (i = 1, 2). We consider the
limit as z goes to zero. Then, zi converges to zero while x∗i remains constant.
Suppose that player i demands x∗i . As analyzed above, if player j demands more
than 1 − x∗i = x∗j , he will make the initial mass acceptance. The probability of
the initial mass acceptance is given by
(1−(Ti /Tj ))

P ma = 1 − zj

.

It converges to one as zj converges to zero. Hence,
EPi ≈ (1 − xj ) + (xj + x∗i − 1) − z1 z2 e−ri Ti (1 − xj ) ≈ x∗i .
Thus, the equilibrium payoﬀ of player i is close to x∗i when zi and zj are small.
The next proposition gives the exact bound by using the same idea.
Proposition 3. In any equilibrium,




1
1
− z1 z 2 +
x∗i < EPi − x∗i < z1 z2 +
x∗j .
e(− log zj )
e(− log zi )
Proof: We consider player i’s strategy for initially demanding x∗i .
When player j initially demands no more than x∗j = 1 − x∗i , player i obtains
a payoﬀ no less than x∗i .
Now suppose that player j initially demands x∗j +  for some  > 0. Since
player j demands more than x∗j , player i can expects player j to make the initial
mass acceptance. The expected payoﬀ of player i is


1−T /T
EPi = (1 − x∗j − ) + (x∗j +  + x∗i − 1) 1 − zj i j
−z1 z2 e−ri Ti (1 − x∗j − )
=

∗
1−(log zi / log zj )(ri /rj )((1−x∗
j −)/(1−xi ))

(1 − x∗j − ) +  − zj

−z1 z2 e−ri Ti (1 − x∗j − )
=

(log zi / log zj )(ri /rj )(/(1−x∗
i ))

(1 − x∗j ) − zj

− z1 z2 e−ri Ti (1 − x∗j − ).

Here, we evaluate each term. Since x∗j /x∗i = (log zi / log zj )(ri /rj ) and x∗j +
/x∗

x∗i = 1, the second term is −zj i . Regarded as a function of , it takes the
smallest value −x∗i /e(− log zj ) when  = x∗i /(− log zj ). The third term, which
is the expected loss from the impasse, is greater than −z1 z2 (1 − x∗j ) = −z1 z2 x∗i .
Combining these with the above, we get
EPi

x∗i
− z1 z2 x∗i
> (1 − x∗j ) −
e(− log zj )


1
∗
+ z1 z2 x∗i .
= xi −
e(− log zj )
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Therefore, the expected payoﬀ of player i from the speciﬁed strategy is no
less than the stated bound, no matter what player j does in the demand stage.
Since the sum of the players’ payoﬀs must not exceed one, we can get the upper
bound of player i’s expected payoﬀ by subtracting her opponent’s lower bound
from one.
This concludes the proof.
Q.E.D.
Observe that both bounds converge to zero when both z1 and z2 converge to
zero. Hence, for small z1 and z2 , the payoﬀ of player i in any equilibrium must
be close to x∗i . (Even when the initial demands are chosen randomly and thus
may cause some delays, the expected eﬃciency loss must be small when both
z1 and z2 are small.)
The multiplicity of equilibria occurs in this model. When the initial demands
are incompatible and when both players become stubborn, agreement becomes
unattainable. For player i, this reduces the expected payoﬀ by z1 z2 e−ri T (1 −
xj ). Hence, when player j’s demand is no greater than x∗j plus this amount,
accommodating player j’s demand is better for player i. This illustrates why the
size of the bounds is asymptotically of the order of z1 z2 . (Note that the term
1/(− log zi ) becomes much smaller than the term z1 z2 when zi is suﬃciently
small.)

4

Extensions

This section brieﬂy explains two extensions of our basic model. The ﬁrst extension introduces risk aversion and relates our result to the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution. The second extension analyzes inborn stubbornness.

4.1

Nash Program

Proposition 3 has shown that bargaining outcomes are approximated by the
immediate settlement at x∗1 , x∗2 when the probabilities of being stubborn are
small. Observe that
x∗1 , x∗2

=

arg max
x1 ,x2

1/(−r1 log z1 ) 1/(−r2 log z2 )
x2

x1

s.t. x1 + x2 = 1
x1 ∈ [0, 1].
Namely, x∗1 , x∗2 can be regarded as the asymmetric Nash solution where player
i’s weight is given by 1/(−ri log zi ) for i = 1, 2. A player who is more patient
and/or who is more likely to be stubborn gets a higher weight and thus has
greater bargaining power. In this sense, our model oﬀers yet another interpretation of the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution, linking the reputation for
being stubborn to the bargaining power in the axiomatic approach.9
9 The approach of relating a non-cooperative model to a cooperative solution is often called
the Nash program, since it was originally proposed by Nash (1953). For more on this subject,
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Our results, including the above interpretation, can be easily extended to
the case of risk-averse negotiators. Suppose that player i’s utility function is
given by ui (y)e−ri t , where u(y) is twice continuously diﬀerentiable, u (y) > 0
and u (y) ≤ 0 for any y ∈ [0, 1]. For normalization, we assume that ui (0) = 0
and ui (1) = 1.
The Appendix shows that, for small probabilities of stubborn types, bargain∗∗
ing outcomes are approximated by the immediate settlement at x∗∗
1 , x2 , which
is the asymmetric Nash solution where player i’s weight is given by 1/(−ri log zi )
for i = 1, 2.
∗∗
x∗∗
1 , x2

=

arg max
x1 ,x2

u1 (x1 )1/(−r1 log z1 ) u2 (x2 )1/(−r2 log z2 )

s.t. x1 + x2 = 1
x1 ∈ [0, 1].
Proposition 4. Suppose that player i’s utility function is given by ui (y)e−ri t .
∗∗
be the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution as deﬁned above.
Let x∗∗
1 , x2
∗∗
is an equilibrium outcome.
(1) The immediate settlement at x∗∗
1 , x2
1/z

1/z

(2) Suppose that zi = αi and zj = αj , where 0 < αi < 1, 0 < αj < 1 and
0 < z < ∞. For any  > 0, there exists a positive z such that, for any 0 < z < z,
∗∗
player i’s payoﬀ is between ui (x∗∗
i ) −  and ui (xi ) +  in any equilibrium.

4.2

Inborn Stubbornness

This subsection studies a diﬀerent scenario where the players know their own
types before they make their initial demands. Our results here are similar to
but weaker than the ones obtained in Section 3 since we need to restrict the
strategy spaces (no random choice of initial demands) and have to employ a
stronger reﬁnement (the semiperfect sequential equilibrium).
Formally, we modify the model stated in Section 2 so that the players privately learn their types before rather than after making their initial demands.
Player i is stubborn with probability zi . We assume that even the stubborn
types can choose their initial demands. The rest of the model is unchanged.
In this formulation, how to assign a reasonable belief to deviant initial demands becomes a diﬃcult issue. Although a ﬂexible type generally wants to
mimic the stubborn type by making the same demand, the sequential equilibrium concept is too weak to restrict beliefs in this way. A player may believe
that a deviation is carried out mainly by a ﬂexible type and may respond in an
aggressive way, discouraging even deviations that beneﬁt a stubborn type. To
exclude beliefs of this type, we resort to a stronger reﬁnement, in this case, to a
see Binmore’s articles in Binmore and Dasgupta (1987), Binmore et al. (1986), and Osborne
and Rubinstein (1990).
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weakened version of the perfect sequential equilibrium by Grossman and Perry
(1986).
Definition (semiperfect sequential equilibrium). For an equilibrium, let
EPif be the payoﬀ of the ﬂexible type of player i and let EPis be that of the

be the expected
stubborn type. Given a deviant initial demand xi , let EPif

payoﬀ of the ﬂexible type and let EPis be that of the stubborn one in a contin
≥ EPif
uation equilibrium where player j uses the prior belief zi . When EPif

and EPis ≥ EPis and when at least one inequality holds strictly, we say that
the deviation is successful and that the examined equilibrium is not semiperfect
sequential.
In perfect sequential equilibria, a deviation is considered to be carried out
by those who can beneﬁt if they as a group are believed to have deviated.
We borrow this idea and deﬁne semiperfect sequential equilibria by assigning
the prior belief to a deviant initial demand as long as it beneﬁts both types.
(We examine only the successful deviation by both types. In this sense, our
reﬁnement is weaker than the perfect sequential equilibrium as originally deﬁned
by Grossman and Perry, 1986.)
When the players randomly choose their initial demands, we need to assign
diﬀerent beliefs to diﬀerent demands, which makes the analysis rather complex.
Because of this diﬃculty, the following analysis focuses on non-random initial
demands.
When the players do not randomly choose their initial demands and when
we look at the semiperfect sequential equilibria, we can show that the players
settle immediately and that, given an excessive demand by player j, player i’s
demand of x∗i would cause player j to make the initial mass acceptance. This
implies that the situation is similar to what we had in Section 3. (The proof of
the next proposition is relegated to the Appendix.)
Proposition 5. Suppose that the players know their own types before they make
initial demands. We apply the semiperfect sequential equilibrium and look only
at the equilibria where the players do not randomly choose their initial demands.
Then,
(1) the immediate settlement at x∗1 , x∗2 is an equilibrium outcome, and
(2) in any equilibrium, the players settle immediately and




1
1
∗
∗
∗
− zj +
xi < EPif − xi = EPis − xi < zi +
x∗j .
e(− log zj )
e(− log zi )

5

Concluding Remark

This paper has demonstrated that the reputation for being stubborn is a source
of bargaining power. It does not, however, explain the origin or formation of the
reputation itself. That will be left for future research. Another issue that this
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paper does not fully address is the eﬀect of other kinds of irrational behaviors
in bargaining. The rest of this section is devoted to a brief discussion of this.
We conﬁne our attention to a special class of stubbornness, namely, the
commitment to one’s initial demand (the commitment type). This is partly
because it is a rather common type of stubbornness observed in daily negotiation
and partly because it can demonstrate how the reputation for being stubborn
enhances bargaining power most clearly. There are other types of irrational
behaviors that can be observed in real negotiations. Some players give in no
matter what the oﬀer is (the chicken type). Some other players always insist on
certain divisions, (the ﬁxed-share types).
Comparison with the results of Abreu and Gul (1997) hints at what happens
when there is a possibility of the chicken type and/or various ﬁxed-share types
as well as the commitment type. It is likely that there will be no equilibrium
where immediate settlement occurs with probability of one. The possibility of
the chicken type causes players to make excessive demands and the possibility
of various ﬁxed-shared types creates a distribution of initial demands, both of
which lead to the occurrence of the war of attrition. On the other hand, we
conjecture that the logic behind Proposition 3 remains valid in the models with
various irrational types and, when the probabilities of irrational types are small,
the equilibrium payoﬀs of the players are close to the ones derived in this paper.
In any case, we ought to pay more attention to bargaining power based on
reputation since the possibility of stubborn negotiators can substantially change
the bargaining outcomes.

Appendix 1: Nash Program
We provide the proof of Proposition 4 here.
Even with risk-averse players, we can prove the same statements as Lemma 0.
However, both ai and Ti take diﬀerent forms. In the same way as in Section 3,
player j is indiﬀerent between accepting and waiting in the war of attrition.
Hence, for a small , we have
accepting:
waiting:

Vj = uj (1 − xi ),
Vj = ai uj (xj ) + (1 − ai )e−rj  Vj .

Solving the system of equations and applying L’Hospital’s theorem by taking 
to zero, we get
rj uj (1 − xi )
.
ai =
uj (xj ) − uj (1 − xi )
From this, we can compute the potential exhaustion time for player i.
Ti =

1
1
1
uj (xj ) − uj (1 − xi )
log .
log =
ai
zi
rj uj (1 − xi )
zi

∗∗
Now compute the just compatible demand pair x∗∗
that reﬂects nat1 , x2
ural bargaining powers. It is deﬁned by the limit of demands when x1 + x2 ↓ 1
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such that T1 /T2 = 1. Note that
Ti
Tj

=
=

ri ui (1 − xj )
log zi (uj (xj ) − uj (1 − xi ))
rj uj (1 − xi )
log zj (ui (xi ) − ui (1 − xj ))
xi + xj − 1
uj (xj ) − uj (1 − xi ) ri ui (1 − xj )
log zi
.
rj uj (1 − xi )
xi + xj − 1
log zj
ui (xi ) − ui (1 − xj )

By taking the limit of the left hand side as x1 + x2 ↓ 1 and by equating it to
∗∗
satisﬁes,
one, we ﬁnd that x∗∗
1 , x2
∗∗
log zi uj (x∗∗
j ) ri ui (xi )

∗∗ = 1.
rj uj (x∗∗
j ) log zj ui (xi )
∗∗
is the solution to the following maximization problem
Observe that x∗∗
1 , x2
that describes an asymmetric Nash bargaining solution where player i’s weight
is given by 1/(−ri log zi ) for i = 1, 2.

max

x1 ,x2

u1 (x1 )1/(−r1 log z1 ) u2 (x2 )1/(−r2 log z2 )
s.t. x1 + x2 = 1
x1 ∈ [0, 1].

We can show that


uj (1 − xi )
uj (xj )
ui (xi )
Ti
∂Ti /Tj
−
=
.
∂xi
Tj uj (1 − xi ) uj (xj ) − uj (1 − xi ) ui (xi ) − ui (1 − xj )
u (x )

j
j
> 1. By the concavity of uj and ui , we have uj (1 −
Since xj > 1 − xi , uj (1−x
i)
xi )(xi +xj −1) ≥ uj (xj )−uj (1−xi ) 
and ui (xi )(xi +xj −1) ≤ ui (xi )−ui (1−xj ).
Combining these, we get (∂(Ti /Tj )) ∂xi > 0. Even when the players are riskaverse, if one of them increases her own demand, she increases her potential
exhaustion time relative to that of her opponent. Hence, the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 1 can be used to prove the ﬁrst claim of the
proposition.
For the convergence result, we consider player i’s strategy for initially de
manding x∗∗
i − .

When player j demands no more than x∗∗
j +  , then the demands are com
patible and player i obtains a payoﬀ no less than ui (x∗∗
i −  ).
∗∗
Now suppose that player j initially demands xj + ξ +  for some ξ > 0.
Note that player j is the one who makes the initial mass acceptance here. Let
P ma be the probability of player j’s initial mass acceptance. The same analysis
as in Section 3 can show that

(1−(Ti /Tj ))

P ma = 1 − zj

.


∗∗

i
Evaluate Ti /Tj at xi = x∗∗
i −  and xj = xj +  and denote it RTj . Since
Ti /Tj is decreasing in xj and is increasing in xi , we obtain Ti /Tj < RTji < 1.
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Observe that 1 − RTji is independent of the absolute sizes of z1 and z2 when, as
1−RT i

j
supposed, the ratio log zi / log zj is kept constant. Hence, 1 − zj
converges
to one as zj (or z) tends to zero. (Note that the convergence is uniform with

1−RT i

j
respect to ξ.) Since P ma > 1 − zj
, P ma also converges to one uniformly.
This implies that there exists a positive z such that, for any z < z, player i


obtains more than ui (x∗∗
i − )− .


Hence, player i obtains more than ui (x∗∗
i −  ) −  no matter what player j

does. By choosing  appropriately, this implies that for any  > 0 there exists
a positive z such that, for any z < z, player i obtains more than ui (x∗∗
i ) − .
By symmetry, we can show that the equivalent statement is true for player j.
Since the sum of the players’ shares must be no more than one, this will prove
the statement about convergence.

Appendix 2: Inborn Stubbornness
This Appendix proves Proposition 5 in two parts. In the proof, the ﬂexible
(stubborn) type of player i is referred to as ﬂexible (stubborn) player i.
The following proofs often need to evaluate the players’ payoﬀs when the
stubborn and ﬂexible types make identical demands. In that case, the situation
given initial demands is identical to the one studied in Section 3 and we can
use the same analyses. When the initial demands are not compatible and when
player j makes the initial mass acceptance, the payoﬀs of player i are as follows.
Flexible:
Stubborn:

EPif = (1 − xj ) + P ma (xi + xj − 1), or
EPis = (1 − xj ) + P ma (xi + xj − 1) − zj e−ri Ti (1 − xj ),

where “Flexible” means the expected payoﬀ of the ﬂexible type and “Stubborn”
means that of the stubborn type. For stubborn player i, the impasse occurs when
her opponent is also stubborn, which happens with probability zj . Thus, the
payoﬀ of stubborn player i is lower than that of ﬂexible player i by zj e−ri Ti (1 −
xj ). On the other hand, player j, who makes the initial mass acceptance, expects
Flexible:

EPjf = (1 − xi ), or

Stubborn:

EPjs = (1 − xi ) − zj e−ri Ti (1 − xi ).

The Proof of the First Part of Proposition 5
Suppose that player i is expected to demand x∗i initially and that she uses the
prior belief zj after any initial demand of player j, including deviant ones.
Either type of player j has no incentive to demand less than x∗j since x∗1 , x∗2
is just compatible.
We now examine player j’s deviation to demand more than x∗j . Since player
i believes that the deviation is carried out by both types, ﬂexible player j has to
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make the initial mass acceptance. Then, as shown above, neither type of player
j increases his payoﬀ.
This proves that the above is an equilibrium and, moreover, that there is no
successful deviation. Therefore, the outcome in the proposition is supported in
a semiperfect sequential equilibrium.

The Proof of the Second Part of Proposition 5
Let xis be the initial demand of stubborn player i and let xif be that of ﬂexible
player i. The next lemma is an extension of the ﬁrst part of Lemma 0.
Lemma A.1. Either if xjf = xjs or if xif = xis , then ﬂexible player i, faced
with oﬀer xjs , immediately accept the oﬀer in the unique continuation equilibrium.
Proof: If xjf = xjs and if ﬂexible player i is faced with oﬀer xjs , then she has
no better alternative than immediate acceptance.
If xjf = xjs and xif = xis , then Lemma 0 has shown that ﬂexible player i
immediately accepts player j’s oﬀer in the unique continuation equilibrium.
Combining these, we obtain the desired statement.
Q.E.D.
The proof proceeds in three parts, depending on the compatibility of the
initial demands by the stubborn types.
(i) The stubborn types of both players initially make incompatible demands:
x1s + x2s > 1. Supposing that xis = xif and xjs = xjf , we show a contradiction
as follows. Without loss of generality, suppose that player i does not make
initial mass acceptance. Then, the above has shown that EPjs < 1 − xis .
Since stubborn player j can obtain the payoﬀ of 1 − xis by initially making the
compatible demand, this is a contradiction.
Next, supposing that xis = xif , we derive a contradiction. (xjs may or may
not be equal to xjf .)
First, we compute the expected payoﬀs of player i. By Lemma A.1, xis is
immediately accepted by ﬂexible player j. Since the demands of stubborn types
are incompatible, the stubborn types get zero when they are matched against
each other. Thus stubborn player i expects (1 − zj )xis . Flexible player i has
the option of mimicking stubborn player i by demanding xis and of accepting
the demand of stubborn player j when her demand is not accepted. Since the
former happens with probability 1 − zj , her payoﬀ from this strategy is no less
than (1 − zj )xis + zj (1 − xjs ). Flexible player i expects to obtain at least this
much.
Now consider the expected payoﬀs of player j. By Lemma A.1, xjs is immediately accepted by ﬂexible player i. Thus, we can use a similar argument to
that above and show that stubborn player j expects (1 − zi )xjs while ﬂexible
player j expects at least (1 − zi )xjs + zi (1 − xis ).
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From these, the ex ante expectation of the sum of the payoﬀs is at least
zi (1 − zj )xis + (1 − zi )((1 − zj )xis + zj (1 − xjs ))
+zj (1 − zi )xjs + (1 − zj )((1 − zi )xjs + zi (1 − xis ))
= (1 − zi )(1 − zj )(xis + xjs − 1) + 1 − z1 z2
> 1 − z1 z2 .
Since stubborn types cannot accept each other’s oﬀer, the beneﬁt from agreement is lost with probability zi zj . This implies that the expected sum of their
payoﬀs cannot be more than 1 − zi zj . This is a contradiction.
Combining the above arguments, we can conclude that xis + xjs > 1 does
not occur in equilibrium.
(ii) The stubborn types of both players initially make strictly compatible demands: x1s + x2s < 1. When both are stubborn, the initial demands are compatible and stubborn player i obtains a payoﬀ that is more than xis and less
than 1 − xjs . When ﬂexible player j demands xjs , stubborn player i expects to
obtain the same payoﬀ as above. If he does not demand xjs initially, by Lemma
A.1, he immediately accepts and stubborn player i obtains xis . Hence, in any
case, the payoﬀ of stubborn player i is strictly less than 1 − xjs and is at least
as much as xis .
Now, consider player i’s deviation to demand 1 − xjs . If the deviation is
believed to be carried out by both types, the above argument still holds and
acceptance by player j is immediate for sure. Then, both types of player i
receive at least 1 − xjs .
If this deviation is not successful, then ﬂexible player i needs to have obtained
more than 1 − xjs in the original equilibrium. Since the stubborn types expect
to obtain at least what they demand as argued above, this implies that ﬂexible
player i expects to obtain more than 1 − xjs from ﬂexible player j. Since the
same is true for player j and (1 − xjs ) + (1 − xis ) > 1, this is impossible.
Therefore, this case does not happen in any semiperfect sequential equilibrium.
(iii) The stubborn types of both players initially make just compatible demands: x1s + x2s = 1. Consider player i’s strategy for initially demanding
xis . When player j’s initial demand is xjs , the demands are compatible and
player i receives the payoﬀ of xis . When ﬂexible player j makes an incompatible demand, by Lemma A.1, the unique continuation equilibrium is that ﬂexible
player j accepts player i’s oﬀer immediately. Hence, by demanding xis , player
i can secure herself at least the payoﬀ of xis . The same logic applies for player
j, who should get at least xjs . Since the sum of the expected payoﬀs cannot be
more than one and since x1s + x2s = 1, this implies that the settlement has to
be immediate at x1s , x2s .
Next, we show the convergence.
Suppose that player j obtains x∗j +  and player i obtains x∗i −  for some
 > 0. Since demanding x∗i should not be a successful deviation for player i,
the payoﬀ from the deviation cannot be higher than x∗i − . (If ﬂexible player i
is expected to demand x∗i originally, we consider a demand slightly bigger than
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x∗i for the deviation.) If both types deviate to a new demand x∗i , then we can
apply the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3 and show that


1
∗
EPif > EPis ≥ xi − zj +
x∗i .
e(− log zj )
Hence, for this deviation not to be successful, it is necessary that


1
 < zj +
x∗i .
e(− log zj )
This gives the lower bound for player i’s payoﬀ. Since the sum of the players’
expected payoﬀs is no greater than one, we can obtain the upper bound by
subtracting player j’s lower bound from one.
This concludes the proof of Proposition 5.
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